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Optimal Solution Analysis and Decentralized Mechanisms for
Peer-to-Peer Energy Markets
Dinh Hoa Nguyen ∗
Abstract
This paper studies the optimal clearing problem for
prosumers in peer-to-peer (P2P) energy markets. It
is proved that if no trade weights are enforced and the
communication structure between successfully traded
peers is connected, then the optimal clearing price
and total traded powers in P2P market are the same
with that in the pool-based market. However, if such
communication structure is unconnected, then the
P2P market is clustered into smaller P2P markets.
If the trade weights are imposed, then the derived
P2P market solutions can be significantly changed.
Next, a novel decentralized optimization approach
is proposed to derive a trading mechanism for P2P
markets, based on the alternating direction method
of multipliers (ADMM) which naturally fits into the
bidirectional trading in P2P energy systems and con-
verges reasonably fast. Analytical formulas of vari-
able updates reveal insightful relations for each pair
of prosumers on their individually traded prices and
powers with their total traded powers. Further, based
on those formulas, decentralized learning schemes
for tuning parameters of prosumers cost functions
are proposed to attain successful trading with total
traded power amount as desired. Case studies on a
synthetic system and the IEEE European Low Volt-
age Test Feeder are then carried out to verify the
proposed approaches.
Keywords. Peer-to-Peer Energy Systems, Bilat-
eral Trading, Optimal Energy Management, Multi-
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Nomenclature
MAS Multi-agent system.
ICT Information and communication tech-
nology.
P2P Peer to peer.
DER Distributed energy resource.
ADMM Alternating direction method of multi-
pliers.
Pij , Pi, Pi,tr Traded power between peers i and j,
vector of peer i traded powers, and peer
i total traded power [kW].
Pmini,tr , P
max
i,tr Lower and upper bounds of total
traded amount of peer i [kW].
G, A, D, L P2P interconnection graph, its adja-
cency, degree, and Laplacian matrices.
1n, In Vector with n elements equal to 1, and
n× n identity matrix.
diag{}, vec() Diagonal or block-diagonal matrices,
and stacked vector.
R, Rn, Rn×m Set of real numbers, real n-dimension
vectors, and real matrices with dimen-
sions n×m.
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1 Introduction
P2P energy system has recently emerged as an at-
tracting concept for novel energy market designs to
push the flexibility, diversity, locality, and low emis-
sion of energy supply and consumption, due to the
increasing penetration of DERs into energy grids
[2,24,26,27]. First, energy losses are reduced in P2P
systems because energy is usually exchanged within
short distances. As a result, investment cost could be
lower. Second, P2P trading platforms are often de-
centralized and localized, which are very suitable for
integrating DERs and give much more flexibility for
prosumers to handle their energy balance and profit.
Next, equipped with advanced ICT technologies, e.g.
distributed ledger technologies and block-chain, the
security and privacy in P2P markets are much better
than that in the conventional bulk energy grids [27].
Last but not least, P2P trading helps promote new
businesses since different models and market scales
can be performed under P2P platforms, e.g. feder-
ated plans [17], full P2P, community-based, or their
hybrid combination [16, 24]. To this end, P2P en-
ergy system will serve as an important base to trans-
form the current top-down, centralized energy net-
works into bottom-up, decentralized ones.
Each peer in P2P energy systems is a prosumer
who can act as a producer at one time and as a con-
sumer at another time. The trading of prosumers is
affected by their preferences, e.g. energy transfer dis-
tance, or the sources of generated powers, etc. Usu-
ally, successful energy transactions are derived with
short transfer distances and clean energy sources to
avoid energy losses and reduce emissions of pollu-
tants. Moreover, the role of each prosumer as a buyer
(consumer) or seller (producer) can change from a
time step to another, because its generation or con-
sumption profile is time-varying and is only known by
prediction in advance. Hence, the optimization prob-
lems arising from the optimal energy management or
optimal planning and operation of P2P energy sys-
tems are essentially different from that in pool-based
energy markets.
Another feature distinguishing P2P energy market
with other energy markets is on the direct energy
trading between each prosumer (peer) with another
communicated prosumer (peer). Therefore, a power
balance constraint is forced to each pair of commu-
nicated prosumers, instead of only one balance con-
straint for the total generated and consumed pow-
ers of all producers and consumers (e.g. in pool-
based markets). In order to deal with this pair-
ing constraint, a number of different P2P trading
schemes has been proposed, e.g. bilateral contracts
[4, 15, 19, 23], game theory based [6, 16, 25, 27], distri-
bution optimal power flow [9], supply-demand ratio
based pricing [13], mixed performance indexes [28],
Lyapunov optimization [12], multi-class energy man-
agement [18], continuous double auction [9], etc.
To solve the optimal energy management problems
arising in P2P energy systems, decentralized opti-
mization approaches are preferred to centralized or
distributed optimization methods, because of the fol-
lowing reasons. First, decentralized approaches nat-
urally fit into the structure of P2P energy systems,
where no central coordination unit is needed and each
peer directly communicates with other peers. Second,
system robustness with respect to failure of individ-
ual parts is better with decentralized optimization
approaches, because if some parts malfunctions, then
the remaining still works, while centralized or dis-
tributed optimization methods have a single point of
failure which stops the whole system from working
if the central unit fails. Third, communication load
is burdened at the central unit in centralized meth-
ods, but is much lessen at each node in decentralized
approaches. As such, most of the existing optimiza-
tion algorithms for P2P energy systems hitherto are
decentralized.
ADMM is originally a distributed optimization ap-
proach which has been most often used in P2P energy
systems research [3, 4, 18, 29]. A direct application
of ADMM to allocate exogenous costs in P2P energy
systems was presented in [3,4], however local ADMM
variables at each prosumer need to be updated in
order. A distributed ADMM method together with
model predictive control were introduced in [18] for
solving a multi-class energy management problem,
but a P2P platform agent exists for calculating dual
prices and solving an optimal power flow problem.
Coordination of P2P energy trade and ancillary ser-
vices was investigated in [29], where global variables
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on energy transfer matrix was required in the utilized
ADMM algorithm. The effects of inter-peer commu-
nication sparsity to an ADMM algorithm convergence
speed and market outcomes and the comparison be-
tween P2P market and other markets were studied
in [3]. However, [3] considered the full communication
structure which incurs more communication loads in
P2P energy systems.
Comparison of different optimization approaches
including ADMM with a central coordinator, primal-
dual algorithms, and Relaxed Consensus + Innova-
tion (RCI) [23] for P2P energy systems has been con-
ducted in [15]. It turned out that the first method is
fastest, while the last method is slowest, which con-
curs with the observation of RCI slow convergence
in [3]. Note that the existing ADMM algorithms for
P2P energy systems require either a central coordina-
tor (i.e. not decentralized), or a sequential update of
local ADMM variables at each prosumer though all
prosumers work in parallel (potentially longer com-
putational time).
In all existing studies on P2P energy systems, two
fundamental issues are commonly assumed, one is the
successful trading of all peers, and the other is the
right selection of cost function parameters by each
prosumer. However, the first assumption can be vi-
olated in realistic situations because of: (i) distinct
expectations between prosumers on the amount of
powers and their prices to be traded; (ii) different
energy preferences from prosumers. Such violation
results in completely different solutions with those
when the assumption is satisfied, as will be shown
later in this paper. The second assumption is also
difficult to be satisfied in reality, because prosumers
cannot know exactly the values of their cost function
parameters for obtaining their expected power trad-
ing amount and price.
This paper aims to fulfill the above research gaps,
thereby contributes the following to the P2P energy
systems research.
• A decentralized, scalable ADMM approach with
parallel updates of prosumers/peers, which also
updates local ADMM variables at each pro-
sumer/agent in parallel, for trading in P2P en-
ergy market. Thus, it is suitable for distributed
and parallel computing platforms, and its com-
putational time is shorter.
• Decentralized learning strategies for tuning pa-
rameters of prosumers cost functions to obtain
successful trading with expected amount of to-
tal traded power.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the optimal energy management
problem in P2P systems and characterizes its optimal
solution in relation with the optimal solution of the
pool-based market. Next, a decentralized P2P nego-
tiation mechanism and decentralized learning strate-
gies for prosumers are proposed in Section 3. Case
studies are then introduced in Section 4 to illustrate
the proposed approaches. Lastly, Section 5 concludes
the paper and provides directions for future research.
2 P2P Electricity Trading
Problem
Consider the P2P energy trading during the time in-
terval [1,T] for a power system consisting of n pro-
sumers, where each prosumer is regarded as a peer
or agent who not only consumes power but also can
produce power with some sort of power generation or
storage. It is assumed that prosumers behave non-
strategically, i.e. they do not try to learn the other
prosumers’ behaviors through the trading process.
Denote Pij(t) the power to be traded at time step t
between the i-th and j-th prosumers, where Pij(t) >
0 means prosumer i buys electricity from prosumer
j, and vice versa, Pij(t) < 0 means prosumer i sells
electricity to prosumer j. To simplify the trading
of prosumers, it is assumed that at each time step
a prosumer only buys or sells power, but not to do
both. In other words, at each time step a prosumer
holds only one role, an energy buyer or an energy
seller.
2.1 Inter-peer Communication Struc-
ture
Denote G(t) the inter-prosumer communication
graph at time step t. Due to the bilateral trading
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between prosumers, G(t) is undirected. Moreover,
G(t) is a bipartite graph whose node set composes
of two disjoint subsets associated to selling and buy-
ing prosumers, instead of a fully connected graph
(c.f. [3,23]). Each node only communicates with other
nodes in another subset, and do not communicate
with nodes inside the same subset.
For each prosumer i, denote Ni(t) its neighboring
set, i.e. the set of other communicated prosumers
for energy trading at time step t. Let E(t) denote
the incidence matrix of G(t) associated with an ar-
bitrary edge orientation. Next, let aij be elements
of the adjacency matrix A(t), i.e. aij(t) = 1 if pro-
sumers i and j are connected at time step t, and
aij(t) = 0 otherwise. The degree matrix D(t) is de-
fined by D(t) = diag{di(t)}i=1,...,n, where di(t) ,∑
j∈Ni(t)
aij(t). Then the Laplacian matrix L(t) as-
sociated to G(t) is defined by L(t) = D(t) −A(t).
2.2 Objective Function
Let ni(t) , |Ni(t)|, Pi(t) ∈ Rni(t) be the vector of
all Pij(t) with j ∈ Ni(t), Pi,tr(t) be its total traded
power. Then Pi,tr(t) = 1
T
ni(t)
Pi(t). Next, denote
Ci(Pi(t)) the total cost of prosumer i for trading in
the P2P market, which composes of three compo-
nents assumed to have the following forms.
Ci,1(Pi(t)) = ai(t)P
2
i,tr(t) + b˜i(t)Pi,tr(t) (1a)
Ci,2(Pi(t)) =
∑
j∈Ni
dijPij(t) (1b)
Ci,3(Pi(t)) = βPi,tr(t) (1c)
The first component (1a) is an utility function whose
parameters ai(t) > 0 and b˜i(t) are available only
for prosumer i, which are presented here as time-
dependent parameters to reflect the time-varying and
complex behaviors of prosumers. The second element
(1b) is a bilateral trading cost associated with the
traded powers with other prosumers, where dij is the
bilateral trade weight (also called trading coefficient
in [23]) enforced on the trading between prosumer i
and prosumer j for the purposes of product differ-
entiation and consumer involvement [23]. For exam-
ple, renewable and clean power would be preferred
to fossil-based power for reducing emissions of pollu-
tants, hence dij associated with the former is smaller
than that corresponding to the latter. The last com-
ponent (1c) is the implementation cost for the traded
powers to be physically executed through the power
network, where β > 0 is a fixed rate.
Therefore, summing up (1a)–(1c) gives us the fol-
lowing total cost of each prosumer in the P2P market,
Ci(Pi(t)) = ai(t)P
2
i,tr(t)+bi(t)Pi,tr(t)+
∑
j∈Ni
dijPij(t)
(2)
where bi(t) , b˜i(t) + β. The assumed formula of
Ci(Pi(t)) above guarantees that it is convex.
2.3 System Constraints
The first constraint is on the bilateral trading power,
i.e.,
Pij(t) + Pji(t) = 0 ∀ j ∈ Ni(t), t = 1, . . . ,T (3)
The next constraint is on the limits of power can be
traded,
Pmini,tr ≤ Pi,tr(t) ≤ Pmaxi,tr ∀ t = 1, . . . ,T (4)
Note that power flow constraints are not considered
here for the sake of simplifying the analytical analy-
sis, and it is assumed that the cost (1c) is paid to the
power network operator for dealing with such flow
constraints.
2.4 Overall Optimization Problem
The optimal clearing strategy for P2P energy trading
is formulated as an optimization problem below.
min
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
Ci(Pi(t)) (5a)
s.t. Pij(t) + Pji(t) = 0 ∀ j ∈ Ni(t) (5b)
Pmini,tr ≤ Pi,tr(t) =
∑
j∈Ni(t)
Pij(t) ≤ Pmaxi,tr (5c)
Pij(t) ≤ (≥) 0 if peer i is a seller (buyer) ∀ j ∈ Ni(t)
(5d)
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Since the cost functions Ci(Pi(t)) are convex and the
constraints are linear, the mathematical program-
ming (5) is convex. It can be seen that (5) is de-
composable with respect to time index, moreover the
role of each prosumer can change between a buyer
and a seller from time to time, thus hereafter we will
solve (5) at each time step and omit the time index.
In the pool-based market, the optimal energy man-
agement problem at each time step t is a social wel-
fare maximization problem, as follows.
min
n∑
i=1
Ci(Pi,tr) (6a)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
Pi,tr = 0 (6b)
Pmini,tr ≤ Pi,tr ≤ Pmaxi,tr (6c)
Pi,tr ≤ (≥) 0 if peer i is a seller (buyer) ∀ j ∈ Ni(t)
(6d)
Solutions of the P2P market problem (5) and the
pool-based market problem (6) will be compared to
show the differences between these two markets.
Remark 1 Time binding constraints, for example
P r,mini,tr (t) ≤ Pi,tr(t)− Pi,tr(t− 1) ≤ P r,maxi,tr (t) (7)
where P r,mini,tr (t) and P
r,max
i,tr (t) are obtained from the
predicted generation and consumption of prosumer i
at time step t, can be included in the P2P optimiza-
tion problem (5). Then solving (5) for all time steps
at once is suitable for day-ahead or longer scheduling
problems. However, this research focuses on the P2P
energy trading one-time-ahead, and therefore solve
(5) consecutively at each time step. As such, at time
step t, Pi,tr(t− 1) is known, hence (7) can be rewrit-
ten as
P r,mini,tr (t)+Pi,tr(t−1) ≤ Pi,tr(t) ≤ P r,maxi,tr (t)+Pi,tr(t−1)
which is similar to (5c), and therefore can be com-
bined into a unique constraint. Note that solving
P2P optimization problem (5) in real-time would be
impractical in real-world systems due to the large
scale of the system and possible latencies on inter-
peer communications. Thus, the interval between two
consecutive time steps is usually an hour or a half
hour in real-world systems.
2.5 Characterization of Optimal Solu-
tion
Define the following Lagrangian associated to (5),
L(Pij , λij) =
n∑
i=1
Ci(Pi)−
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
λij(Pij+Pji) (8)
where λij are the Lagrange multipliers associated to
the power trading equations (5b), which are regarded
as the market clearing prices for energy transactions
between pairs of prosumers. To essentially compare
the solution of the P2P market (5) with the pool-
based market (6), only the equality constraints are
considered in the following, since the inequality con-
straints in those problems are the same. The KKT
conditions read as,
∂Ci
∂Pij
∣∣∣∣
P∗
ij
= λ∗ij ∀ j ∈ Ni (9a)
P ∗ij + P
∗
ji = 0 ∀ j ∈ Ni (9b)
Condition (9a) leads to
2aiP
∗
i,tr + bi + dij = λ
∗
ij ∀ j ∈ Ni (10)
which shows that the trade weights dij are parts of
the prices λij . Denote
P ∗tr , [2a1P
∗
1,tr, . . . , 2anP
∗
n,tr]
T , α ,
[
1
2a1
, . . . ,
1
2an
]T
Theorem 1 The following statements hold.
(i) If no trade weights are imposed, i.e. dij =
0 ∀ i, j = 1, . . . , n, and the communication graph
between successfully traded peers is connected,
then all transaction prices are the same and
equal to
λ∗ =
∑
bj/(2aj)∑
1/(2aj)
(11)
The optimal total trading power for each peer is
P ∗i,tr =
∑
bj/(2aj)
2ai
∑
1/(2aj)
− bi
2ai
(12)
The sub-indexes in (11) and (12) are taken for
successfully traded peers. Moreover, these opti-
mal price and total traded powers are the same
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with the optimal solutions of the social welfare
maximization problem (6).
(ii) If dij = 0 ∀ i, j = 1, . . . , n, and the communi-
cation graph between successfully traded peers is
unconnected, then the considering P2P market is
clustered into smaller P2P markets, each of them
has a different energy price. The optimal price
and traded powers for each smaller P2P market
are calculated similarly to (11) and (12).
(iii) If dij 6= 0, then energy prices for successful
transactions are different from each other. The
optimal total traded powers are computed from
[E,α]TP ∗tr = [vec(bj + dji − bi− dij)T , 0]T (13)
Proof. See Appendix.
It is worth emphasizing that the above classical La-
grangian method does not give us a way to compute
the individual traded power Pij in each transaction,
instead it only provides the total traded power Pi,tr.
Further, as seen in Theorem 1, the optimal energy
prices and trading powers are dependent only on suc-
cessfully traded prosumers, which, in realistic situa-
tions, could be a subset of all participated prosumers.
Thus, in the next section, a decentralized approach is
proposed to analytically derive the power amount Pij
and energy price in each successful transaction in P2P
energy market. Then decentralized learning methods
are proposed to tune the prosumers cost function pa-
rameters such that all of them can successfully trade
with desired power amounts.
3 P2P Energy Negotiation
Mechanism and Prosumer
Learning Strategy
3.1 Decentralized P2P Negotiation
Mechanism
In the following, a decentralized ADMM approach is
proposed to solve the mathematical programming (5)
in parallel. The advantage of this approach is that it
allows each prosumer (peer) to solve its own local op-
timization problem while negotiating with other pro-
sumers to eventually reach the solution of the global
optimization problem (5). Thus, the communica-
tion and computation burden at a central entity is
avoided, and the privacy of each prosumer can be
better guaranteed.
It should be noted that the classical two-block
ADMM method [5] is centralized (could be imple-
mented in a distributed manner), and the updates of
variables are in order. On the other hand, the exist-
ing multi-block ADMM approach [7] allows variables
to be updated in parallel, but requires fully connected
inter-agent communication which is not fitted into
the bipartite structure of the considering P2P energy
system. Therefore, in this research, a novel decen-
tralized ADMM approach is proposed for the P2P
energy market that solves (18) in parallel at all pro-
sumers, and local variables at each prosumer are also
updated in parallel.
Denote m ,
∑n
i=1 ni, P ∈ Rm the vector of all
Pi, i = 1, . . . , n, and the sets of equality constraint
(5b) and inequality constraint (5c) as in (14) and
(15), respectively.
Ωeq , {P ∈ Rm : Pij(t) + Pji(t) = 0 ∀ j ∈ Ni} (14)
Ωineq ,
{
P ∈ Rm : Pmini,tr ≤ 1TniPi ≤ Pmaxi,tr
}
(15)
For those sets, the following indicator functions are
defined.
Ieq(P ) ,
{
0 : P ∈ Ωeq
+∞ : P /∈ Ωeq (16)
Iineq(P ) ,
{
0 : P ∈ Ωineq
+∞ : P /∈ Ωineq (17)
Now, by utilizing a new variable X ∈ Rm, the opti-
mization problem (5) is rewritten such that equality
and inequality constraints are separated into different
sets corresponding to different variables P and X , as
follows.
min
n∑
i=1
Ci(Pi) + Ieq(P ) + Iineq(X) (18a)
s.t. P −X = 0 (18b)
P ∈ Ωeq, X ∈ Ωineq (18c)
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Obviously, (18) is in the standard form of the ADMM
method [5]. Define the following augmented La-
grangian,
Lρ(P,X, u) =
n∑
i=1
Ci(Pi) + Ieq(P ) + Iineq(X)
+
ρ
2
‖P −X + u‖22
where ρ > 0 is a scalar penalty parameter and u ∈
R
m is called the scaled Lagrange (dual) multiplier [5].
Next, the variables P,X, u are computed in parallel at
each algorithm iteration k+1 by solving the following
sub-problems,
Xk+1 , argmin
X∈Ωineq
Lρ(P
k, X, uk) +
1
2
(X −Xk)TΨ(X −Xk)
P k+1 , argmin
P∈Ωeq
Lρ(P,X
k, uk) +
1
2
(P − P k)TΦ(P − P k)
uk+1 , uk + κρ(P k+1 −Xk+1) (19)
in which Φ,Ψ, κ > 0 satisfy
Φ ≻ ρ( 1
µ1
− 1)I, Ψ ≻ ρ( 1
µ2
− 1)I, µ1 + µ2 < 2− κ
(20)
for some µ1 > 0, µ2 > 0. Condition (20) was proved
to be sufficient for the convergence of the above vari-
ables update [7]. Note that the selection of Φ,Ψ, κ
to fulfill (20) is not unique. One simple way is to let
Φ = φI, Ψ = ψI such that
φ > ρ(
1
µ1
−1), ψ > ρ( 1
µ2
−1), µ1+µ2 < 2−κ (21)
There are also multiple choices of µ1, µ2 and κ to
satisfy (21). For instance, let µ1 = µ2 = 0.5, then
(21) becomes φ > ρ, ψ > ρ, κ < 1, which will be
used in the case studies later.
Stopping criteria for the iterative process above are
[5]
‖rk‖2 ≤ ǫpri, ‖sk‖2 ≤ ǫdual, (22)
where rk , P k −Xk and sk , −ρ (Xk −Xk−1) are
primal and dual residuals at iteration k; ǫpri > 0 and
ǫdual > 0 are primal and dual feasibility tolerances
chosen by [5]
ǫpri =
√
n+mǫabs + ǫrelmax{‖P k‖2, ‖ −Xk‖2},
ǫdual =
√
n+mǫabs + ǫrel‖ρuk‖2,
(23)
Here, ǫabs > 0 and ǫrel > 0 are absolute and relative
tolerances, set in this research to be 10−4 and 10−3,
respectively. The verification of (22) in a decentral-
ized manner were presented in [21, Theorem 2], hence
is omitted here for brevity.
The updates of variables P and X in (19) are de-
pendent only on their values at the previous iteration,
hence can be made without any order, unlike other
existing ADMM algorithms for P2P energy systems
in the literature, e.g. [3, 4, 15, 18, 29], where variables
depend on the others at the current iteration and
must be updated one after another.
3.1.1 The Update for Variable X
The update for Xk+1 in (19) is derived by solving the
following optimization problem.
min
ρ
2
‖P k −X + uk‖22 +
ψ
2
‖X −Xk‖22 (24a)
s.t. Pmini,tr ≤ 1TniXi ≤ Pmaxi,tr ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (24b)
Note that there is one more constraint on the posi-
tiveness or negativeness of each Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, de-
pending on whether prosumer i at the next time slot
will perform as a buyer or seller. In any case, (24)
is a quadratic convex problem and is decomposable
to each prosumer/peer, i.e. it is fully decentralized,
hence it can be easily solved by any off-the-self soft-
ware embedded in each prosumer/peer, e.g. CVX [1].
3.1.2 The Update for Variable P
To obtain the update for P k+1 in (19), we need to
solve the following mathematical programming.
min
n∑
i=1
Ci(Pi) +
ρ
2
‖P −Xk + uk‖22 +
φ
2
‖P − P k‖22
(25a)
s.t. Pij + Pji = 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n; j ∈ Ni (25b)
7
Denote λij > 0 the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the constraint (25b), and λi ∈ Rni the vector of
all λij with j ∈ Ni. Since (25) is a convex optimiza-
tion problem with quadratic cost function and linear
equality, the strong duality holds and KKT condi-
tions apply. Therefore, we obtain from (25) that
λk+1ij =
∂
∂Pij
(
n∑
i=1
Ci(Pi) +
ρ
2
‖P −Xk + uk‖22
+
φ
2
‖P − P k‖22
)∣∣∣∣
Pij=P
k+1
ij
= 2aiP
k+1
i,tr + (ρ+ φ)P
k+1
ij + v
k
ij (26)
where vkij , bi + dij + ρ(−Xkij + ukij) − φP kij . Next,
due to the bilateral trading constraint (25b), the La-
grange multipliers and the traded powers must satisfy
the following constraints.
λk+1ij = λ
k+1
ji , P
k+1
ij = −P k+1ji ∀ j ∈ Ni (27)
Here, λk+1ij is considered to be the trading price be-
tween the i-th and j-th prosumers. Denote
vˆk+1i ,
∑
j∈Ni
vk+1ji , v˜
k+1
i ,
∑
j∈Ni
vk+1ij
vˆk+1 ,
[
vˆk+11 , · · · , vˆk+1n
]T
, v˜k+1 ,
[
v˜k+11 , · · · , v˜k+1n
]T
Γ , (ρ+ φ)diag{ 1
ai
}i=1,...,n
Theorem 2 The iterative update for individual
power and energy transaction price are as follows.
P k+1ij =
vk+1ji + 2ajP
k+1
j,tr − vk+1ij − 2aiP k+1i,tr
2(ρ+ φ)
(28a)
λk+1ij =
vk+1ji + 2ajP
k+1
j,tr + v
k+1
ij + 2aiP
k+1
i,tr
2
(28b)
where P k+1i,tr is computed from
(L+ Γ)vec(2aiP k+1i,tr ) = vˆk+1 − v˜k+1 (29)
As k →∞ and ρ→ 0, the optimal total traded power
and optimal energy price converge to that stated in
Theorem 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 2 Equation (29) can be solved in a decen-
tralized manner as a decentralized least-square prob-
lem using several methods, e.g. [11, 14]. Details are
ignored here for brevity.
3.2 Prosumer Cost Function Parame-
ters Tuning by Learning
3.2.1 Learn For Successful Trading
As discussed before, it is possible that not all partic-
ipated prosumers successfully trade. Therefore, this
section proposes a simple but effective learning strat-
egy for prosumers (peers) to adjust their cost function
parameters to obtain successful energy transaction,
when their previous attempt was failed.
One possible reason for negotiation failure is the
dissatisfaction of energy price and the constraint
P ∗i,tr > 0 (P
∗
i,tr < 0) for buying (selling) prosumer
i, which lead to P ∗i,tr = 0. Hence, the proposed strat-
egy is based on the analytical formula (12) of the
optimally traded powers to change prosumers param-
eters. Recalling from (12) that
P ∗i,tr =
∑
bj/(2aj)
2ai
∑
1/(2aj)
− bi
2ai
=
∑
(bj − bi)/(2aj)
2ai
∑
1/(2aj)
(30)
Consequently, the unsuccessfully traded prosumers
keep their parameters ai unchanged, while decreas-
ing (increasing) their parameters bi if they are buying
(selling) prosumers. As such, P ∗i,tr will be increased
(decreased) for buying (selling) prosumers. This pro-
cess is repeated, and the increase or decrease of bi at
each repetition can be selected to be a constant, for
simplicity. Then unsuccessfully bought (sold) pro-
sumers will eventually get P ∗i,tr > 0 (P
∗
i,tr < 0), i.e.
successful transactions.
This learning procedure can also be physically ex-
plained as follows. The quantity 2aiP
∗
i,tr + bi, which
is the partial derivative of prosumer i cost function
Ci(·) with respect to Pi,tr at its optimal value, is of-
ten regarded as an optimal marginal cost. Therefore,
if prosumer i is a buyer who decreases bi while keep-
ing ai unchanged, then his marginal cost decreases,
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i.e. he can get more profit. Similarly, if prosumer j is
a seller who can increase bj and hold aj unchanged,
then his marginal cost increases, i.e. he is willing to
lower his profit. As a result, following the proposed
learning method, prosumers will gradually match the
expected profits of the others, and achieve successful
energy transactions.
3.2.2 Learn For Increasing Traded Power
Amount
Employing (30), there are two possible ways to boost
the amounts of traded powers: (i) increase bi; (ii)
decrease ai, for instance by a magnitude of γ, with
γ > 1. While both the former and the latter method
can boost the traded amounts of powers by γ times,
the former obviously rises the trading price due to the
increase of vij and Pij in (28b). On the other hand,
the latter does not necessarily increase the trading
price, because bi and aiPij remain the same in (28b).
Thus, the latter method is selected as the learning
method for increasing the amounts of traded power
in P2P energy market.
Finally, the proposed decentralized P2P ADMM
algorithm and decentralized cost function parameters
learning methods are summarized in Figure 1.
4 Case Studies
4.1 Synthetic System
This section aims at illustrating the effectiveness of
the proposed decentralized optimization algorithm
and decentralized learning strategies for P2P energy
trading on a synthetic example. A system of 6 pro-
sumers is considered with the parameters given in
Table 1. The parameters ai, bi of prosumers are in-
spired by that of generators reported in the literature
(e.g. that in [21] and references therein). P2P energy
trading is assumed to occur every hour.
Six scenarios will be considered. Scenarios 1 ex-
amines the solutions of the pool-based market and
compares them with the P2P market solutions. Then
scenarios 2 and 3 with different inter-peer communi-
cation structures will be investigated (see first two
True  
False  
? All prosumers keep ?? unchanged
? Buying prosumers: decrease ??
? Selling prosumers: increase ??
Decentralized prosumers 
parameters learning
Initialization 
At iteration ?, prosumers exchange  
with their communicated neighbors
Prosumers simultaneously solve 
(21) for X-update, solve (26) and 
compute (25) for P-update and
price negotiation
Stopping criteria 
are satisfied
Decentralized P2P 
ADMM algorithm
??,??? = 0
???? + 2????,???
Finish
Amounts of 
traded powers 
are satisfied
True  
All prosumers keep ?? unchanged, 
and decrease ??
False  
Figure 1: The proposed distributed P2P ADMM op-
timization and decentralized prosumers cost function
paramters learning approach at a time step.
Table 1: Parameters for synthetic system.
Prosumer 1 2 3 4 5 6
ai 0.0031 0.0074 0.0066 0.0063 0.0069 0.0095
bi 8.71 3.53 7.58 2.24 8.53 3.46
Pmini,tr [kW] -105 -115 -125 0.01 0.01 0.01
Pmaxi,tr [kW] -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 100 110 95
9
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Figure 2: Time-varying inter-peer communication
structure.
graphs in Figure 2). Next, in the 4th scenario, re-
sults of P2P market when a prosumer changes its
role will be presented (see the last graph in Figure
2). These four scenarios do not consider the bilateral
trade weights dij , hence scenario 5 will investigate
the effects of such weights. Lastly, scenario 6 demon-
strates the proposed decentralized learning strategies
in Section 3.2 such that all prosumers successfully
trade. In all illustrating figures, dash lines repre-
sent energy transaction prices, whereas solid lines
show traded powers. All simulations are conducted in
MATLAB installed on a computer equipped with In-
tel Core i7-6700K CPU 4GHz and 64GB RAM. Opti-
mization problem (24) for variableX update is solved
by the software CVX [1]. All variables are initialized
at zero.
4.1.1 Scenario 1 (Pool-based market)
Decentralized ADMM approaches for solving the
problem (6) without P2P energy trading was pro-
posed in our previous works [20,21]. The results pre-
sented in Figure 3 are obtained using the algorithm
in [20] with ρ = 0.02, φ = 0.021, ψ = 0.021, κ = 0.99.
4.1.2 Scenario 2 (P2P market with buyer-
seller complete communication)
In this scenario, each buying prosumer is communi-
cated with each selling prosumer, as displayed in the
first graph in Figure 2. Parameters used in the pro-
posed Decentralized ADMM algorithm are the same
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Figure 3: Power trading in Scenario 1.
with scenario 1. Simulation results depicted in Fig-
ure 4 show that peer 2 and peer 5 do not trade, but
energy prices of all successful transactions are identi-
cal, because the communication graph between suc-
cessfully traded peers is connected. Additionally, the
total traded power of each peer and energy price are
the same with that obtained in scenario 1. This con-
firms the first statement of Theorem 1.
4.1.3 Scenario 3 (P2P market with buyer-
seller incomplete communication)
Suppose that the communication link between the
1st and 6th prosumers is removed, as seen in the
second graph in Figure 2. ADMM parameters are
the same with scenario 2. Simulation results for this
scenario are then shown in Figure 5. Similar to sce-
nario 2, peer 2 and peer 5 also do not successfully
trade. On the other hand, peer 1 only sells power
to peer 4, whilst peer 3 only sells power to peer 6,
hence the communication graph between successfully
traded peers is unconnected. This results in a clus-
tered P2P market consisting of two small P2P mar-
kets with different energy prices. This result illus-
trates the 2nd statement of Theorem 1.
4.1.4 Scenario 4 (P2P market with role
changing of peers)
This section demonstrates the P2P market flexibil-
ity and time-varying behaviors of prosumers, where a
seller, particularly peer 2, now becomes a buyer. Ac-
10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
Iterations
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
Tr
ad
ed
 p
ow
er
 [k
W
]
Peer 1
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
O
pt
im
al
 p
ric
e 
[ce
nts
/kW
h]Power with peer 4
Power with peer 5
Power with peer 6
Price with peer 4
Price with peer 5
Price with peer 6
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
Iterations
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Tr
ad
ed
 p
ow
er
 [k
W
]
Peer 2
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
O
pt
im
al
 p
ric
e 
[ce
nts
/kW
h]
Power with peer 4
Power with peer 5
Power with peer 6
Price with peer 4
Price with peer 5
Price with peer 6
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
Iterations
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
Tr
ad
ed
 p
ow
er
 [k
W
]
Peer 3
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
O
pt
im
al
 p
ric
e 
[ce
nts
/kW
h]
Power with peer 4
Power with peer 5
Power with peer 6
Price with peer 4
Price with peer 5
Price with peer 6
Figure 4: P2P power trading in Scenario 2.
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Figure 5: P2P power trading in Scenario 3.
cordingly, lower and upper bounds for traded powers
of peer 2 are reversed with opposite signs. ADMM
parameters are the same with scenario 2.
The simulation results are then displayed in Figure
6. Peer 5 again does not trade, like in all previous
cases, but peer 2 now buys power from both peer
1 and peer 3. Peer 4 and peer 6 also buy power
from both peer 1 and peer 3. It is noted that the
traded price and powers in this scenario are distinct
from that in scenarios 2 and 3 because of peer 2 role
changing, which illustrate the time-varying behaviors
of prosumers in P2P energy market.
4.1.5 Scenario 5 (P2P market with effects of
bilateral trade weights)
The communication structure between buying and
selling prosumers in this case is the same with that in
scenario 2, and single-criterion bilateral trade weights
are enforced for each transaction based on the energy
sources, i.e. renewable or fossil-based. As such, we
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Figure 6: P2P power trading in Scenario 4.
assume that peer 1 is fossil-based producer, whilst
peer 2 and peer 3 are renewable producers, and
d41 = 0.51, d51 = 0.51, d61 = 0.72, d42 = d43 = 0.1,
d52 = d53 = 0.12, d62 = d63 = 0.04. These param-
eters show strong preference of buyers to renewable
over fossil-based power, and the strongest supporter
is peer 6.
The simulation results in this scenario are then
shown in Figure 7 with ρ = 0.009, φ = 0.0091, ψ =
0.0091 which give heuristically fastest convergence
among many different values of ρ, φ, ψ. It is observed
that peers 2 and 5 are unsuccessfully traded, like in
scenarios 2–4, while results for other peers are sub-
stantially changed because of the trade weights dij ,
as anticipated in the 3rd statement of Theorem 1.
First, the energy transaction prices are no longer
the same as in Scenario 2, even the buyer-seller com-
munication structure is complete. Second, the trad-
ing of each buyer-seller pair are completely different
from that in previous cases. Particularly, the power
that peer 6 trades with peer 1 becomes very small, 5.1
kW, in comparison with 51.2 kW in Scenario 2. Peer
6 then turns to peer 3 to buy 90.1 kW from it. This is
fully explainable due to the strong opposition of peer
6 to fossil-based generation (peer 1) while showing
high interest in renewable supply (peer 3). Hence,
in realistic P2P energy markets, trade weights can
be employed by prosumers to help attain strategic
objectives such as emissions reduction, loss decrease,
etc., for example by putting small values for renew-
able and big values for fossil-based sources.
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Figure 7: P2P power trading in Scenario 5.
Table 2: Convergence time for synthetic system.
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6
Time 0.008s 11s 10.6s 7.9s 17.9s 10.3s
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Table 3: Total traded power (in black) and costs (in red) of prosumers in different scenarios.
Pros. Scen.1 Scen.2 Scen.3 Scen.4 Scen.5 Scen.6
1
-105 -105 -100 -105 -105 -105
-669.9 -669.9 -810 -480.9 -742.35 -649.95
2
0 0 0 70.93 0 -96.13
0 0 0 -480.9 0 -595.05
3
-90 -90 -95 -124.83 -90 -103.87
-574.2 -574.2 -600.97 -571.72 -636.3 -642.96
4
100 100 100 100 100 100
638 638 810 458 707 619
5
0 0 0 0 0 110
0 0 0 0 0 680.9
6
95 95 95 58.9 95 95
606.1 606.1 600.97 269.76 671.65 588.05
4.1.6 Scenario 6 (Decentralized learning for
successful trading)
This section illustrates the decentralized learning
strategy for obtaining successful trading proposed in
Section 3.2. The inter-peer communication structure
is the same with that in scenario 2. Since peer 2 and
peer 5 were failed to trade with other peers in all
previously introduced scenarios, the proposed learn-
ing strategy is only applied to them. Accordingly, a2
and a5 are kept unchanged, whereas b2 is increased
and b5 is decreased.
The simulation results exhibited in Figure 8 are ob-
tained when b2 = 7.53 and b5 = 4.53. It can be seen
that all peers now successfully trade, which demon-
strates the efficiency of the proposed learning strat-
egy.
Next, convergence time (without inter-peer com-
munication time) of the proposed decentralized
ADMM algorithm for P2P trading in all scenarios
is shown in Table 2. It can be observed that com-
putational time of scenario 5 with trade weights is
longest, while that of scenario 1 with pool-based mar-
ket is fastest, and that of the others are quite sim-
ilar. This is logical because in pool-based market,
no convex optimization problem is needed to solve in
the X-update step, unlike that in the P2P market,
and trade weights make bilateral trading asymmetric
leading to more time for convergence.
Finally, total traded powers and costs for pro-
sumers across all scenarios are provided in Table 3.
Those for scenarios 1 and 2 are the same, as seen
before. Total traded costs in scenarios 3 and 4 are
significantly different from other cases, as the system
is clustered (scenario 3), or a prosumer switches be-
tween selling and buying roles (scenario 4). Total
traded costs in scenario 6 reveal that prosumers 4
and 6 need to pay less, whereas prosumer 1 suffers
a bit loss, and prosumer 3 gains considerably more,
compared to scenarios 1 and 2. Hence, the decen-
tralized learning for successful trading of prosumers
2 and 5 not only helps themselves but also is bene-
ficial for many other prosumers, though not all. On
the other hand, energy price is increased in scenario 5
though trade weights help change the traded amounts
of powers, leading to higher payments for prosumers
4 and 6, and simultaneously bring more profit to pro-
sumer 1 and 3. Thus, how to choose the best trade
weights to enforce on bilateral trading between pro-
sumers needs further investigation.
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Figure 8: P2P power trading in Scenario 6.
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Figure 9: Diagram of the IEEE European Low Volt-
age Test Feeder.
4.2 Modified IEEE European Low
Voltage Test Feeder
In this section, validation of the proposed approach
is carried out for the IEEE European Low Voltage
Test Feeder having 55 nodes [10] shown in Figure
9. It is assumed that 25 nodes have 5.5kW rooftop
solar systems, while the remaining nodes have 3kWh
battery systems. P2P energy trading is allowed in
this system each one-hour interval. One-hour load
profiles of 55 nodes are taken from [10], and average
daily global solar irradiance data in July in Spain are
obtained from [8]. Then power output of 5.5kW solar
systems are computed using the formula in [22] (see
Eq. (6) in [22]), where temperature effect (see Eq.
(7) in [22]) is ignored because it is very small. Load
demands of all 55 nodes and solar power output are
depicted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Load demands and assumed solar genera-
tion in the IEEE European Low Voltage Test Feeder.
As seen in Figure 10, at noon solar generation is
maximum, while 25 solar-equipped nodes have maxi-
mum demands of 3.5kW, therefore they have at least
2kW solar power redundant which will be sold to
other 30 nodes. As such, there are 25 selling and
30 buying prosumers, and the inter-prosumer com-
munication graph has 750 edges. Initially, parame-
ters ai and bi are randomly generated in the intervals
[0.005, 0.009] and [12.4, 31.2], respectively.
Running the proposed decentralized ADMM ap-
proach for P2P energy trading between prosumers
gives us the results in Figure 11. As seen in Figure
11, the total selling and buying powers of prosumers
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Figure 11: Convergence of total traded power and
optimal price for P2P trading between prosumers.
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Figure 12: Convergence of total traded power and
optimal price for prosumers P2P trading when ai are
decreased.
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are far from their maximum capacities. Thus, us-
ing the proposed decentralized learning method for
tuning prosumers parameters, all prosumers reduces
their parameters ai by randomly regenerating them
in the interval [0.002, 0.006]. The simulation results
for the new values of ai are depicted in Figure 12. It is
obviously observed in Figure 12 that the total traded
power of prosumers are significantly increased in ab-
solute values, which validates the proposed learning
strategy. The optimal prices are not much different
between two cases. Similar simulation results are ob-
tained at other time steps.
The merits of P2P energy trading here are as fol-
lows. First, it reduces power flows from and to
the bulk grid by local consumption, hence eases
power losses and voltage/frequency problems. Sec-
ond, households with renewable generation can save
their investment costs by selling excessive renewable
energy to other neighboring households instead of
storing with battery storage systems.
4.3 Scalability of The Proposed Ap-
proach
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Figure 13: Computational time of the proposed dis-
tributed P2P ADMM approach vs. system size.
The proposed decentralized ADMM algorithm run-
ning times for the above two cases of IEEE European
Low Voltage Test Feeder are 14.2s and 21.2s, which
are just double of that for the synthetic system (c.f.
Table 2), while the maximum number of communi-
cated peers (i.e. trades) per prosumer is 30, i.e. 10
times bigger. Next, the proposed algorithm is tested
for larger systems, one with 75 selling and 90 buying
prosumers, and the other with 150 selling and 180
buying prosumers. Running time for the former is
117.6s, while that for the latter is 1022.9s. As seen in
Figure 13, computational time of the proposed P2P
ADMM approach is not exponentially increased with
system size, hence is scalable well.
Note that the computational time shown in Figure
13 does not take into account the inter-peer commu-
nication time which may contain delays. In prac-
tical implementation, communication latency is an
issue needs to be carefully handled for both cen-
tralized, distributed, and decentralized approaches,
due to the tradeoff between communication load and
computational ability. Centralized and distributed
approaches have the advantages of stronger compu-
tational capability at the central unit and less to-
tal number of communication links over decentralized
approaches. On the other hand, all communication
tasks occur at the central unit in centralized and dis-
tributed optimization approaches, of which commu-
nication latency could become a critical issue, while
communication load at each agent in decentralized
approaches could be much fewer. However, commu-
nication delay is out of scope of the current research,
and will be addressed in the future work.
5 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a decentralized ADMM op-
timization approach for P2P energy markets and de-
centralized learning strategies for prosumers to ob-
tain successful transactions and total traded powers
as they expect. Analytical formulas for the amount
of power and its associated transaction price in each
trading between a pair of prosumers were derived,
which reveal insights on the relation between indi-
vidual trading with the total traded amount of each
prosumer, trade weights, and prosumer cost function
parameters. These serve as bases for the proposed
decentralized learning strategies to tune prosumers
cost function parameters, and for the choice of trade
weights to attain strategic objectives such as pollu-
tant emissions reduction. The effectiveness and scal-
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ability of the proposed approaches were illustrated
through different case studies.
In the next research, more complex models of P2P
market participants, power flow constraints in the
P2P energy systems, and the interaction of P2P
markets with other markets should be investigated.
Moreover, different factors such as communication
delays, systematic way to choose trade weights, etc.,
should also be studied.
Appendix
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
When dij = 0 ∀ i, j = 1, . . . , n, and the commu-
nication graph between successfully traded peers is
connected, it is easy to see from (10) that λ∗ij are
the same for all j ∈ Ni, hence are the same for all
i = 1, . . . , n due to the symmetry of the trading and
the connectedness of the communication graph. The
unique price is calculated by 2aiP
∗
i,tr+bi = λ
∗. Based
on this, we can easily derive λ∗ as in (11) due to the
fact that
∑n
i=1 P
∗
i,tr = 0, and then obtain P
∗
i,tr as in
(12).
Next, utilizing the KKT conditions to the social
welfare maximization problem (6), we also obtain
the clearing energy price equals to ∂Ci
∂Pi,tr
∣∣∣
P∗
i,tr
=
2aiP
∗
i,tr + bi. As such, the energy price in this mar-
ket is the same with that in P2P market without
trade weights. Consequently, it is obvious that the
total traded energy of each peer in the P2P market
is equal to that in the pool-based market. In case
this graph is unconnected, i.e. the considering P2P
market is clustered into smaller P2P markets, each
cluster inherits the above properties.
Finally, if dij 6= 0, then (10) can be stacked to-
gether to obtain ETP ∗tr = vec(bj + dji − bi − dij). In
addition, the condition
∑n
i=1 P
∗
i,tr = 0 is rewritten as
αTP ∗tr = 0. Therefore, we have (13).
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Substituting (27) into (26) gives us
2aiP
k+1
i,tr + (ρ+ φ)P
k+1
ij + v
k
ij
= 2ajP
k+1
j,tr − (ρ+ φ)P k+1ij + vkji
which is (28a). Using this to compute λk+1ij leads to
(28b). Then summing up (28a) for all j ∈ Ni gives
us
P
k+1
i,tr =
∑
j∈Ni
v
k+1
ji +
∑
j∈Ni
2ajP
k+1
j,tr −
∑
j∈Ni
v
k+1
ij − 2niaiP
k+1
i,tr
2(ρ+ φ)
which is equivalent to
2(ρ+ φ+ niai)P
k+1
i,tr −
∑
j∈Ni
2ajP
k+1
j,tr
=
∑
j∈Ni
v
k+1
ji −
∑
j∈Ni
v
k+1
ij (31)
Equation (31) is rewritten exactly as (29). Next, the
convergence of the proposed ADMM algorithm fol-
lows that provided in [7], hence we omit the proof
here for brevity. Lastly, substituting the converged
solutions to (26) leads to λ∗ij = 2aiP
∗
i,tr + bi + dij +
ρu∗ij . Thus, as ρ → 0, λ∗ij = 2aiP ∗i,tr + bi + dij , solu-
tions in Theorem 1.
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